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Abstract 
The growing wage gap in South Africa has far-reaching socio-
economic consequences. This study investigated the nature of 
executive remuneration issues raised by shareholder activists in 
the country. An analysis of 24 510 votes cast by 17 investment 
managers at 347 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange in 2013 revealed that the vote to endorse companies’ 
executive remuneration policies evoked the most opposition. 
Well-known shareholder activist, Theo Botha, also criticised 
companies for failing to disclose sufficient details on their 
remuneration policies. A disconnect between the performance 
of companies and their executives’ pay was also noted. It 
is recommended that the non-binding vote on executive 
remuneration be revised and more investor education provided. 
Introduction
The role of ethics in investing has long been debated in academic 
circles. In one of the first articles on the topic, Irvine (1987: 236) 
introduced the Enablement principle. This principle states that 
it is morally wrong for a person to do something that enables 
others to do wrong. In a corporate context, this principle 
implies that shareholders should not enable managers to do 
wrong. For the purposes of this article, corporate wrongdoing 
is seen to extend beyond obvious acts of unethical behaviour 
(such as the misappropriation of funds) to the perpetuation of 
an unjust society. 
South Africa has one of the largest wage gaps in the world. 
A 2013 study found that chief executive officers (CEOs) of 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
earned as much as 53 times the amount of the average worker 
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in their companies (Bronkhorst, 2014). The top seven CEOs earned a staggering 300 times 
that of the average worker. 
The remuneration committees of JSE-listed companies, however, justify executives’ 
large compensation packages by stating that they need to attract, retain and motivate 
talented individuals (Hogg, 2008; Gilmour, 2013). This point, often made by companies 
that compete globally (Bronkhorst, 2014), is not without some merit. A remuneration 
committee that approved a substantial increase in its CEO’s emolument package 
remarked: “No matter how immoral executive remuneration may seem to be to the rest of 
us, it has to be competitive. We simply can’t afford to be bold in terms of the moral side 
of the equation and cut executive pay, because we would then run a real risk of losing 
some of our talented executives who have specialised knowledge and skills and who are 
also very mobile” (Barron, 2014a).
Some South African executives also believe that they are entitled to large compensation 
packages (Crotty, 2014c). The CEO of a major platinum mine allocated R76,4 million 
(+/- US$7,64 million) in share options to 12 executives, at a time when the company 
refused to increase the minimum wage to R12 500 (+/- US$1 250) per month, justifying 
the decision as follows: “Am I [the CEO] getting paid on a fair basis for what I’m having 
to deal with in this company? Must I run this company and deal with all this nonsense 
for nothing? I’m at work. I’m not on strike. I’m not demanding to be paid what I’m not 
worth” (Rose, 2014). The CEO later apologised for his public outburst (Patton, 2014). 
The strike that the abovementioned CEO referred to was the worst mining strike in 
South Africa’s history. It lasted for five months and forced businesses in Rustenburg to 
their knees, a city where mining-related activities account for about half the jobs and 
60 per cent of the local economy (Burkhardt & Janse, 2014). Mineworkers who did not 
receive their monthly salaries as a result of the “no-work, no-pay” principle, defaulted 
on their payments at furniture stores and other businesses where they had bought on 
credit. Tuck shops, street vendors and taxi operators were also adversely affected by the 
strike as they rely heavily on mineworkers for their income (Tau, 2014). 
The mounting discontent among mineworkers also sparked a countrywide strike by the 
National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa in July 2014. Workers were quoted as 
saying that CEOs were being paid according to Western standards, while they “remain 
stuck in the third world” (Pickworth, 2014). 
The growing wage gap and associated stakeholder discontent is not unique to South 
Africa. As far back as 1990, Jensen and Murphy investigated public claims of “excessive” 
executive compensation in the United States (US). They argued that executive 
remuneration was not necessarily “excessive”, but expressed concerns about the 
disconnect between company performance and the nature of performance incentives 
offered to executives. The authors called on boards to allocate a larger percentage of their 
company’s equity to CEOs, offer substantial cash rewards for outstanding performance 
and impose meaningful penalties for poor performance. 
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Since the publication of Jensen and Murphy’s (1990) seminal article, many other 
researchers have also determined that executives’ salaries and incentives are practically 
independent from company performance (Conyon, 1997; Vitulano & Hannafey, 2009; 
Faulkender et al., 2010; Purcell, 2011). Recommendations on how to restructure and 
rein in executive remuneration has ranged from legislation to allocating stock options 
and improving the public disclosure of executive remuneration policies and practices 
(Chan, 2009). 
Levitt (2004) claimed that the single greatest impediment to the restoration of confidence 
in corporate America after the bursting of the dot.com bubble was “continuing instances 
of extravagant non-performance-based compensation”. The same argument resurfaced 
after the 2008 financial crisis and resulted in shareholders across the globe taking a more 
active interest in the topic of performance-based executive remuneration (Del Guercio et 
al., 2008; Bhagat & Romano, 2009; Palmon et al., 2009; Ferri & Maber, 2013). 
Although shareholder activism is not a new phenomenon (Waddock & Graves, 2004), it 
is increasingly seen as an effective means of promoting change in corporate policies and 
practices, including those dealing with executive emolument (Del Guercio & Tran, 2012). 
A number of mechanisms available to shareholders to monitor and exert pressure on 
managers are set out in Table 1. 
Table 1: Shareholder activism mechanisms
Nature of engagement Mechanism
Private (informal) efforts by  
shareholders to initiate change
Writing letters
Negotiating with management in private
Divesting (i.e. selling all the shares owned in a company that fails to 
respond to shareholders’ requests to transform)
Legal proceedings to enforce shareholder rights
Public (formal) endeavours by 
shareholders to promote change
Filing of shareholder resolutions
Asking questions at annual general meetings (AGMs)
Voting proxies
Stimulating public debate on issues of concern (e.g. by raising issues 
at conferences or talking to the media)
Sources: Karpoff et al., 1996; Guay et al., 2004; McLaren 2004; Hendry et al., 2007; De Bakker and Den Hond, 2008; Gifford, 
2010; Judge et al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2011; Nordén & Strand 2011.
A strong case can be made as to why shareholders should monitor and influence 
managers’ actions for their own and the greater good. This case is based on the notions 
of reciprocity, interdependence and accountability (Goodstein & Wicks, 2007). It has long 
been recognised that moral relationships are reciprocal and deeply influenced by the 
respective parties’ perceptions of fairness. Philips (1997) posits that “whenever persons 
or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutual beneficial scheme of 
co-operation, requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the participants, and 
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there exists the possibility of free-riding, obligations of fairness are created among the 
participants in the co-operative scheme in proportion to the benefits accepted.” 
When applying Philips’ argument to a corporate context, it is clear to see why shareholders 
have an obligation of fairness. Not only do they voluntarily accept the benefits (dividends 
and capital gains) from jointly funding the operations of a company, but there is also 
the very real possibility of free riding. As will be shown later in this article, very few 
shareholders in South Africa take the time or effort to engage with managers on matters 
related to corporate wrongdoing. 
Shareholder responsibility also arises from the interdependence between shareholders, 
firms and society. The Latin root of the word responsibility is respondere which literally 
means to “pledge back” and involves a continuous commitment to the greater good. 
According to Goodstein and Wicks (2007), this interpretation of responsibility emphasises 
the notion that shareholders and managers share a common fate and suggest that both 
parties should “pledge things to each other so as to foster co-operation and enhance 
the welfare of society”. Whereas some “pledges” are explicit and formalised, others 
are reinforced through implicit norms, based on trust. In the context of this research, 
shareholders could pledge their continued support for management (for example by re-
electing certain individuals) if management undertakes to compensate executives in an 
equitable manner. 
A third way of understanding shareholder responsibility is connected to the notion 
of accountability. Goodstein and Wicks (2007) claim that the most important way in 
which shareholders and managers can honour their “pledges” is through making 
morally acceptable decisions and being accountable for their actions and impacts. A key 
consideration in determining accountability is whether the party in question has the 
capacity to produce consequences that matter to others. As illustrated earlier, decisions 
relating to executive remuneration could disrupt the lives of employees and those who 
depend on their income. As future dividends and capital gains are also likely to be 
adversely affected by disruptions to social cohesion, shareholders have a definite interest 
in ensuring fair decision making in this regard. 
As the enablers and beneficiaries of corporate activity, shareholders have a responsibility, 
not only to monitor managers’ behaviour for any wrongdoing, but also to influence their 
decisions to contribute to the greater good (or common fate as Goodstein and Wicks 
(2007) calls it). Nowhere is this responsibility more apparent than in the recent debate on 
excessive executive remuneration. 
Problem Statement and Research Objectives 
very few academic studies have been undertaken on the mechanisms used by shareholder 
activists in South Africa. Whereas Veicht (1995) investigated the role of institutional 
investors in addressing weak corporate governance among JSE-listed companies, Bhana 
(2010) considered the matter from an individual investor perspective. The legal aspects 
associated with shareholder activism were evaluated by Rademeyer and Holtzhausen 
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(2004) and Lekhesa (2009), while Fumpa (2011) and Reddy and Giamporcaro (2011) 
explored the role of trade unions in engaging investee companies. For the rest reference 
is only briefly made to shareholder activism in articles dealing with responsible investing 
in South Africa, for example Heese (2005) and Viviers et al. (2009). 
To address the gap in the literature, this article will provide an overview of shareholder 
activism in South Africa, both from an institutional and individual investor perspective. 
Specific attention will be paid to the executive remuneration issues raised by local 
shareholder activists. Insight into the executive compensation issues that provoke 
shareholder opposition could enable JSE-listed companies to be more proactive on the 
matter, thereby avoiding reputational damage. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: In the next section, an introduction 
to and overview of shareholder activism will be presented, both internationally and 
in South Africa. The methods used to collect and analyse data will then be presented 
followed by the main findings and recommendations for remuneration committees, 
academics and the South African regulator. 
Shareholder Activism: An Introduction to the Phenomenon
Shareholder activists are investors who use their equity stake in a company (called 
the investee company) to question managerial decisions and demand accountability. 
Investors are typically classified as institutional investors (such as pension funds, 
insurance companies, banks and collective investment schemes) or as individual investors 
(Renneboog et al., 2008). Religious groups in the US were the first institutional investors 
to publicly raise their concerns about human rights and labour standards as early as 
the 1940s. Public pension funds only followed suit in the 1980s after religious and other 
activist organisations established the legitimacy of the social issue agenda (Proffitt & 
Spicer, 2006). 
As “bastions of capital”, public and private pension funds have a critical role to play 
in redressing “inflamatory imbalances between executive and worker remuneration” 
(Picketty, 2014). The literature review suggests that pension funds and other institutional 
investors are slowly beginning to take their responsibility more seriously in curbing the 
wage gap (Sjöstrom, 2008; Wen, 2009; Poulsen et al., 2010; Hadani et al., 2011). Given their 
size, institutional investors have more incentives and resources to monitor the actions of 
remuneration committees compared with their individual counterparts (Gillan & Starks, 
2000, 2007; Almazan et al., 2005).
In addition to the mechanisms listed in Table 1, shareholders who are not satisfied with 
the manner in which managers respond to their requests, could also do the so-called 
“Wall Street Walk”, that is, they could sell all the shares they own in a specific company 
and invest elsewhere (Meznar et al., 1998; Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009). This shareholder 
activism mechanism is generally only used by institutional investors, as divestment by 
individual investors does not have a significant impact on a company’s share price or 
cost of capital.
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Institutional shareholder activism received a significant boost in 2006 with the 
launch of the United Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). PRI 
signatories are encouraged to be active owners who incorporate environmental, social 
and corporate governance (ESG) considerations into their ownership policies and 
practices. On 31 December 2014, 286 asset owners in 27 countries were PRI signatories. 
It is estimated that these owners manage assets to the value of US$45 trillion 
(UNPRI, 2015). 
Research shows that the mechanisms used by shareholder activists differ from country 
to country. Activists in the United Kingdom (UK) and Sweden, for example, prefer private 
forms of activism (Short & Keasey, 1999; Becht et al., 2010; Poulsen et al., 2010), while 
public activism is more evident in the US (Bauer et al., 2012). 
Most cases of shareholder activism is financially motivated and involves, among others, 
pressurising management to spin-off loss-making divisions and increase dividend pay-
outs (Ntim et al., 2012). In contrast to shareholder activists’ financial motivation, socially-
orientated shareholder activists endeavour to create a more just society (Hendry et al., 
2007). Issues pertaining to sustainability, human rights and labour standards are thus 
often high on the agenda of social shareholder activists (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). Although 
executive remuneration has financial implications, activism on this issue is generally 
classified as social rather than financial. 
Nordén and Strand (2011) ascribe the rise in social shareholder activism to a growing number 
of investors wanting to comply with external, normative pressures such as culture, law, 
politics, informal codes of conduct, and societal expectations. Some authors (such as Cespa 
& Cestone, 2007) contend that financial and social shareholder activism are converging, 
and attribute this trend to a growing realisation among companies and shareholders of 
their mutual dependence. McLaren (2004) also a mutual interest in the collective social 
benefits that can result from engagement among shareholders and companies. 
The extent to which institutional investors monitor managers’ behaviour, be it financially 
or socially driven, has been shown to be positively associated with company size (Waddock 
& Graves, 2004; Ng et al., 2009; Judge et al., 2010), poor prior financial performance of a 
company (Karpoff et al., 1996), inadequate corporate governance (Morgan et al., 2011) 
and significant institutional ownership (Bauer et al., 2012). A number of factors that have 
a negative impact on activism intensity have also been identified in the literature. These 
include concerns about fiduciary duty (Almazan et al., 2005), potential business relations 
with investee companies (Davis & Han Kim, 2007) and the so-called “free rider” problem 
that exists due to the private cost of monitoring (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).
The rise in shareholder activism has not been without controversy. The phenomenon has 
been described as “disruptive, opportunistic, misguided and at best ineffective” (Becht et 
al., 2010: 3094). Hendry et al. (2007) point out that some managers resent being told how to 
run their companies by investors who have no management experience. However, these 
managers should realise that investors also resent it when managers destroy shareholder 
value, whatever the reason may be.
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The question of how effective shareholder activists have been in influencing corporate 
decision making on policies and practices has been extensively researched (Wen, 2009). 
Mixed evidence has been reported on shareholders’ ability to influence the level and 
composition of executive pay packages. Thomas and Martin (1999), for example, found 
that individual shareholder activists have not been successful in amending executive 
remuneration policies. The authors attributed their findings to the limited capacity of 
individual shareholders to understand and monitor complex compensation policies. 
As far as institutional investors are concerned, a number of studies reported that “against” 
or “no” votes at AGMs have been ineffective in reducing executive remuneration and/or 
restructuring emolument packages (Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2013). In 
contrast to these findings, Ferri and Maber (2013) ascertained that many UK companies 
removed controversial CEO remuneration practices, such as generous severance 
contracts, and by increasing the sensitivity of performance-based bonuses in response 
to negative say-on-pay votes. A significant reduction in CEO remuneration as a result of 
shareholder opposition were also reported by Cheffins and Thomas (2001) and Ertimur 
et al. (2010).
As indicated earlier, very limited academic research has been done on shareholder 
activism in South Africa. In the following section an attempt will thus be made to present 
an overview of the mechanisms used by institutional and individual shareholder activists 
in the country. 
Shareholder Activism in South Africa
In view of the relatively small size of the JSE1, divestment is generally not used as a 
shareholder activism mechanism by South African institutional investors (Boshoff 
& Schulshenk, 2014). Withdrawing from an already limited investment universe will 
leave institutional investors with poorly diversified domestic portfolios (Baue, 2002). 
In contrast to the US, local shareholders hardly ever revert to legal proceedings and 
the filing of shareholder resolutions to enforce their rights (Lekhesa, 2009; Silverman & 
Duncan, 2014). Local institutional investors furthermore have a poor track record when 
it comes to asking questions and voting at AGMs (Barron, 2008; Crotty, 2010; Mathews 
& Hasenfuss, 2013). Barron (2011) claims that this passiveness “goes back to the bad old 
days when there was an old boys’ network. You had the mining houses and the banks 
and everybody owned shares in each other and they all met at the Rand Club, and 
nobody rocked the boat”. 
The Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) was one of the pioneers of shareholder 
activism in South Africa. The GEPF is the largest pension fund in the country, with more 
than 1,2 million active members and assets worth more than R1 trillion (+/- US$1,25 
billion) (GEPF, 2015a). Being one of the founding members of the United Nations’ 
Principles for Responsible Investment in 2006, the GEPF is committed to use its financial 
strength to build a better society (GEPF, 2015b). Although the pension fund occasionally 
engages with investee companies, most of its activism initiatives are outsourced to the 
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Public Investment Corporation (PIC). The PIC also invests on behalf of other public 
sector entities, and is thus one of the largest asset managers in Africa (PIC, 2015). 
Under the leadership of Brian Molefe (2003–2010) the PIC publically engaged with 
several JSE-listed companies, mainly on transformation-related matters (Robbins, 2008; 
Mantshantsha, 2013). Following the appointment of the new CEO, Dr Dan Matjila, the 
PIC’s approach to activism has changed considerably: “We [the PIC] engage with lots of 
companies behind the scenes, but prefer to keep details of discussions out of the media” 
(Barron, 2014b). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority of other institutional 
investors in South Africa also prefer to discuss their concerns with investee companies in 
private (Anderson, 2006; Cohen, 2011; Winfield, 2011) 
To encourage institutional shareholder activism in the country, the Association of Savings 
and Investments SA compiled a Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA, 
2011). Developed in conjunction with the Institute of Directors Southern Africa and the 
Principal Officers Association, CRISA draws heavily on recommendations of the PRI and 
the third King report (the King III report) on corporate governance in South Africa.
Despite these positive developments as well as changes to pension fund legislation in 
2011, institutional shareholder apathy is still endemic in the country (Crotty, 2014b; 
Couldridge, 2014). This state of affairs may be as a result of, among others, a lack of 
interest among trustees (Cairns, 2014), business relations between investment managers 
and investee companies, resulting in conflicts of interest (Crotty, 2012b), and inefficient 
skills among practitioners in the entire investment chain (Herringer et al., 2009). These 
barriers to shareholder activism are also reported in international research on the topic 
(Ng et al., 2009; Huppé & Bala-Miller, 2011). 
A number of individuals have become prominent shareholder activists in South Africa. 
These include Theo Botha, Issy Goldberg, Roy McAlpine, and a gentleman colloquially 
called “Mr Hayden” in the press (Barron, 2011; Carte, 2011). Of these, Theo Botha is 
by far the most vocal and well-known individual shareholder activist in the country 
(Bhana, 2010; Mpofu, 2013; Gardee, 2014; Shevel, 2014). Botha was born in 1960, and later 
obtained a Bachelor of Commerce (honours) degree in accounting at the University of 
South Africa (Unisa). He completed his articles at PricewaterhouseCoopers, but had to 
return to his family’s farm in 1987 after his father passed away (Steyn, 2011). Currently, 
Botha is a part-owner and director of CA Governance, a leading independent corporate 
governance practitioner in South Africa (CA Governance, 2015). 
After making a small investment in 2002 in the Sage Group, a South African life assurance 
company, Botha discovered that the company failed to disclose losses in its US operations 
to local shareholders (Keeping tycoons on their toes, 2007). He privately questioned 
management on the omission, but the company responded by saying that its financial 
statements complied with local disclosure requirements. Unsatisfied with the response, 
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Botha raised the issue at the company’s AGM. As he received the same brush-off as 
earlier, he decided to approach the media. Following the media reports, Sage’s share price 
did not only fall dramatically, but its credit rating was also downgraded a few weeks later 
(Planting, 2012). 
Since his initial deliberations with the Sage Group, Botha has engaged with numerous 
companies listed on the Johannesburg and London Stock Exchanges. His efforts in 
highlighting unsatisfactory accounting, financial and ESG practices, have earned 
him a reputation as a corporate watchdog, or to be more specific, a terrier (Creamer, 
2009; Shevel, 2014). The so-called “Botha sting” has also resulted in a significant 
decrease in companies’ share prices after being publically criticised by the activist 
(Bhana, 2010). 
Given that individual shareholder activists rarely have access to corporate managers 
(De Bruin, 2014), their activism endeavours are essentially limited to raising questions at 
AGMs and in the media. 
Research Methodology 
A mixed methods approach was used to identify the key issues raised by shareholder 
activists on executive remuneration in South Africa. Given the absence of academic 
literature on the topic in South Africa, an extensive review of media and industry reports 
was thus necessary. 
Data collection and analysis: institutional shareholder activism in 
South Africa
As most private negotiations between shareholder activists and investee companies in 
South Africa take place behind closed doors, no data were available to investigate the 
issues raised at these meetings. A decision was therefore made to focus on the proxy 
voting outcomes of a sample of local investment managers who invest on behalf of 
institutional shareowners.2 Publicly available proxy voting data for 2013 were gathered 
from the websites of 17 of the largest investment managers in South Africa. Where 
proxy voting data were not publicly available, it was requested directly from investment 
managers. Details on the domains, codes and sources of data used in constructing the 
proxy voting database are provided in Table 2. 
Resolutions pertaining to preference shares, exchange traded funds, N-shares and 
B-shares were excluded from the database. For comparative purposes, only resolutions 
tabled at AGMs in 2013 were analysed. A total of 24 510 votes at 347 JSE-listed companies 
were analysed using descriptive statistics.3 
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Table 2: Description of the proxy voting database
Domain Code Data source(s)
Name of investment 
manager
Abax Investments; Afena Capital; Allan Gray; Cadiz Asset 
Management; Coronation Fund Managers; Element 
Investment Managers; Foord Asset Management; 
Futuregrowth Asset Management; Investec Asset 
Management; Kagiso Asset Management; Old Mutual 
Investment Group (SA); Public Investment Corporation; 
Prescient Investment Management; Prudential Portfolio 
Managers; Stanlib; Taquanta Asset Managers; Vunani Fund 
Management
Share code of  
JSE-listed company
Share code 
Date of listing of  
JSE-listed company
Date of listing Sharenet and 
ShareData 
websites
Industry classification 
of JSE-listed 
company(a)
Resources (J004); Basic industries (J010); General 
industries (J020); Non-cyclical consumer goods (J030); 
Cyclical consumer goods (J040); Cyclical services (J050); 
Non-cyclical services (J060); Financials (J080); Information 
technology (J090); AltX 
Sharenet and 
ShareData  
websites
Meeting type Annual general meeting; General meeting; Extraordinary 
general meeting; Scheme meeting; Special meeting 
Documents 
available on 
the investment 
managers’ 
websites or 
provided by them. 
Resolution The exact wording of the resolution that was voted on Ditto 
Resolution type Ordinary; Special Ditto
Manager vote For; Against; Abstain Ditto
“Against” theme 42 codes categorising financial and corporate 
governance-related resolutions
The researchers’ 
own coding based 
on terminology 
used in the 
Companies Act 
(No. 71 of 2008), 
the JSE listings 
requirements and 
the King III report 
Voting outcome Passed; Rejected; Withdrawn RMB Custody and 
Trustee Services
(a) The industry classification of the FTSE/JSE Africa Index Series (2014) was used. 
Data collection and analysis: individual shareholder activism in 
South Africa
Considering Theo Botha’s prominence as an individual shareholder activist in South 
Africa, a decision was made to focus on his endeavours over the period May 2002 to 
December 2014. Newspaper articles reporting on Botha’s interactions with JSE-listed 
companies were identified using key words such as “Theo Botha”, “Brian Molefe”, “Public 
Investment Corporation”, “PIC”, “Government Employees Pension Fund”, “GEPF”, “Code 
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for Responsible Investing in South Africa”, “CRISA”, “Regulation 28”, “annual general 
meeting”, “AGM”, “shareholder activism”, “shareholder engagement”, “proxies”, “proxy 
voting”, “resolutions”, “institutional investors” and “minority investors”. 
To gain more insight into Botha’s raison d’être, an in-depth personal interview was also 
conducted with the shareholder activist in July 2013. Follow-up discussions were held 
with him to verify the accuracy of data collected, and to determine whether there were 
any additional engagements not reported in the media. The collected data were coded 
and analysed using the three phases of deductive qualitative content analysis (Elo & 
Kyngäs, 2007). In the first phase, a categorisation matrix was developed to code data 
according to categories (such as financial and ESG issues). Next, the data were reviewed 
and coded for correspondence with, or exemplification of, the identified categories. 
Finally, the contents of the categories were described by means of sub-categories. The 
category dealing with corporate governance issues was, for example, sub-divided into 
issues dealing with the board of directors, executive remuneration and communication 
with shareholders. 
Botha consented to his name to be used in this study and was given the opportunity to 
verify the accuracy of the data. Care was taken to ensure the credibility and reliability 
of the findings. 
Empirical Findings
Institutional shareholder activism on executive remuneration in 
South Africa
Only 6,6 per cent of all votes cast by the investment managers in the 2013 sample were 
“against” votes. However, informal discussions with selected investment managers 
revealed that the low percentage of “against” votes should not be viewed as investor 
inactivity, but rather as the result of successful private negotiations that took place 
with investee companies prior to the AGMs in 2013. Table 3 presents a summary of the 
executive remuneration resolutions that received opposition. 
The “against” votes on executive remuneration issues represented 37,3 per cent of all 
“against” votes in 2013. The resolution requiring shareholder endorsement of a company’s 
remuneration policy evoked the highest number of opposition votes of all 42 resolutions 
investigated in this study. As this vote is non-binding, remuneration committees do 
not have to amend their policies in response to the vote outcome. Despite the non-
binding nature of the vote on shareholder endorsement of a company’s remuneration 
policy, research by Ernest & Young (E&Y) showed that a considerable number of local 
remuneration committees changed their remuneration policies in response to the 
2013 vote. One third of the remuneration committees in the E&Y survey regarded an 
“against” vote of 30 per cent or more as a warning signal of growing shareholder dissent 
(Remuneration Governance in South Africa – 2013 Survey results, 2013). 
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Quite a few resolutions requiring shareholder approval in terms of directors’ fees and 
performance incentives also attracted opposition in 2013. The findings of the current study 
support anecdotal evidence in earlier years that institutional investors are becoming more 
vocal about executive compensation in South Africa. For example, in 2011, the majority 
of shareholders vetoed a proposed 40 per cent increase in non-executive directors’ fees 
at Spur Corporation, a local restaurant chain (Vallie, 2011). In the same year, Investec’s 
Stephen Koseff was reported to be South Africa’s highest-paid banker, despite the fact 
that the company showed the lowest returns among the country’s five largest banks. 
Unsurprisingly, 28 per cent of shareholders opposed the company’s remuneration policy 
in the following year (Vanek, 2012c). Shareholders were also quick to question the virtual 
doubling of the steel giant ArcelorMittal’s CEO’s remuneration package in 2012 (Filen, 
2012). Also in 2012, the majority (75 per cent) of Central Rand Gold’s shareholders voted 
against the company’s director remuneration report (Faku, 2012). As this was the largest 
“no” vote to date recorded in South Africa, a clear message of shareholder dissent was 
sent to management. 
Table 3: Executive remuneration-related resolutions that received “against” votes 
Category Resolution
No of resolutions 
receiving “against” 
votes
Remuneration policy Endorsing the company’s remuneration policy 228 228
Directors’ fees 
and performance 
incentives
Approving non-executive directors’ remuneration/fees 95
168
Approving the share incentive plan 21
Approving the issue of shares to directors and/or 
prescribed officers under the share incentive plan 17
Issuing ordinary shares for the purpose of share options 10
Approving the chairperson’s remuneration/fees 8
Amending the share incentive plan 6
Approving the share option plan 4
Adopting an employee forfeitable share plan 3
Amending the long-term incentive plan 2
Adopting the long-term incentive plan 1
Approving the long-term incentive plan 1
Total 396 396
Botha’s concerns about executive remuneration in  
South Africa
Before providing details on the executive remuneration issues raised by Botha, a short 
description is provided on his modus operandi. In line with institutional investors, Botha 
also prefers to target large, well-known companies (Bhana, 2010). Once a company has 
been selected, Botha prepares meticulously for the company’s AGM. It could take him 
up to five hours to examine the company’s annual report. He also reads at least five 
years’ annual reports before attending a company’s AGM (Barron, 2008) and scrutinises 
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circulars and information posted on the web (Tredway, 2004). “From the Sage experience 
in 2002 I’ve learnt to read through a company’s public information very closely”. In a 
few cases, Botha sent his list of questions to managers prior to a company’s AGM. As 
indicated in Table 4, he attended 143 AGMs of 58 JSE-listed companies over the period 
May 2002 to December 2014. In some of these cases, Botha only owned one share in a 
company to gain access to its AGM. 
Table 4: Shareholder activism mechanisms used by Botha (May 2002–December 2014)(a)
Mechanism No of cases
Asking questions at AGMs(b) 143 
Making comments about a specific company/director in the media(c) 44 
Engaging in private discussions with directors prior to or after an AGM 8 
Engaging with the JSE about misbehaving listed companies 3 
Initiating legal proceedings 3 
(a)  These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Botha terms them as “different arrows for his bow” and suggests that 
individual shareholder activists should use as many mechanisms as possible to convey their viewpoints.
(b)  The names of the companies are listed in Appendix A.
(c)  Media comments have increased considerably in 2014 as a result of a regular “soap box” insert which Botha writes for 
Moneyweb [a South African online business newspaper]. 
Once at an AGM, Botha asks questions and insists that both his questions and directors’ 
responses are minuted (Petros, 2009; Crotty, 2011). He believes that proper record keeping 
is necessary to hold directors accountable from one AGM to the next. Apostolides (2007: 
1277) once remarked that companies often regard their AGM as “an annual headache 
where management is questioned by social activists”. According to Rose (2007), South 
African managers are no exception, especially when Botha attended their AGMs. Table 
5 provides a number of the executive remuneration issues which Botha raised with JSE-
listed companies, using one or more of the activism mechanisms described above. 
Executive remuneration issues represented a fifth (21,9 per cent) of all issues that Botha 
has raised with JSE-listed companies over the past 13 years. Information in Table 5 
confirms that inadequate disclosure of remuneration policies has been “a major bone of 
contention” for Botha. At present, JSE-listed companies are required by law to disclose 
details of executive and non-executive directors’ fees and remuneration in their annual 
reports (Naidoo, 2002). The King III report recommends that this disclosure should be done 
on an individual basis, showing specific elements of each director’s compensation package, 
i.e. basic salary, bonuses and share options. Botha’s calls for better disclosure go a step 
further in that he wants to see more information on the performance targets, benchmarks 
and key performance indicators used by remuneration committees to determine the extent 
of executives’ pay packages (Rose & Shevel, 2009; De Waal, 2011; Vanek, 2012a; Crotty, 
2013a; Hedley, 2013; Gilmour, 2014). 
Botha argues that more information is necessary to hold remuneration committees 
accountable, and to determine whether executive pay is “appropriate or excessive” (Botha 
in Crotty, 2012a). The absence of accountability is further compounded by the lack of 
comparative figures from previous years (Schumacher & Monteiro, 2009). In 2013, Botha 
commended a large banking group for improving its disclosure “on the complex issue of 
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executive remuneration”, but remarked that he still found it difficult to obtain a precise 
indication of the value of top managers’ packages (Crotty, 2013b). 
Table 5: Executive remuneration issues raised by Botha (May 2002–December 2014)(a)
Category Sub-category No of times the issue was raised
Remuneration policy
Poor or inadequate disclosure on the remuneration policy 
(failure to disclose performance targets/benchmarks/key 
performance indicators/caps and changes to the policy) 24 24
Justification of the 
size and composition 
of executive 
remuneration 
packages 
Justification of remuneration packages in general 21
41
Justification of remuneration packages in light of poor 
financial performance 18
Justification of remuneration packages in light of 
retrenchments and strikes 2
Composition and 
responsibility of 
remuneration 
committees
Questions related to the responsibility of the remuneration 
committee (such as them serving the interests of directors 
and not the interests of shareholders) 8
15
Concerns about the composition of the remuneration 
committee (mainly deals with the independence of certain 
committee members) 7
Directors’ fees 
and performance 
incentives
Unequal treatment of directors in terms of rewards 5
9
Failure by the remuneration committees to link directors’ 
fees to their attendance of board meetings 4
Other 
Inaccurate calculation or disclosure of bonuses, sign-on fees, 
ex gratia fees, severance packages etc. 7
17
Concerns about the growing wage gap in a particular 
company 3
Other(b) 7
Total 106 106
(a)  The issues listed in this table are only those that appeared in local newspapers and magazines. Journalists may not have 
reported on all the issues raised by Botha, as he sometimes had up to 20 questions (Mantshantsha, 2007).
(b)  “Other” remuneration issues dealt with directors receiving bonuses before shareholders had approved of it; the board’s 
endorsement of “excessive remuneration” at a time of weak commodity prices; directors’ earning fees as a result of a pyramid 
structure (rather than fees being based on performance), the allocation of broad-based black economic empowerment 
shares to a white, female director, and unsecured loans being made available to directors on very lenient terms.
It is interesting to note that the vast majority of Botha’s requests for improved 
remuneration disclosure (86,5%) occurred after the 2008 global financial crisis. This 
finding concurs with increased appeals from investors around the globe for greater 
transparency on executives’ emolument packages after 2008 (Palmon et al., 2009). 
Botha has, on numerous occasions, requested boards to justify the size and composition 
of executives’ compensation packages (Monterio, 2009; Crotty, 2012b; Vanek, 2012b; 
Mathews, 2014; Ndzamela, 2014). In the majority of these cases, the criticism was based 
on poor financial performance of the company in the same or preceding year (Benjamin, 
2009; Hasenfuss, 2009a; Harris, 2013). Botha had particularly harsh criticism towards 
companies that increased executives’ pay in the midst of destructive industrial action 
and/or retrenchments (Carte, 2009). The same applied to remuneration committees that 
ignored the growing wage gap in their company (Mantshantsha, 2007; Patton, 2014), and 
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those that failed to cap performance bonuses allocated to executive managers (Whitfield, 
2011). Botha was also opposed to non-executive directors who received fees despite their 
poor attendance of board and board committee meetings (Mamtse, 2007; Ashton, 2008; 
Barry, 2014b). 
As a campaigner for sound corporate governance in South Africa (Hasenfuss, 2006), 
Botha is renowned for asking pressing questions about the size and lack of disclosure of 
sign-on fees, the allocation of share options, relocation allowances, ex gratia fees, and the 
clawing back of bonuses that have been paid to directors before shareholder approval was 
obtained (Hogg, 2009; Monteiro, 2009; Carte, 2010; Mantshantsha, 2010; Crotty, 2012a). 
Having repeatedly challenged the independence of directors who serve on remuneration 
committees (Cobbett, 2007; Mokopanele, 2008; Cokayne, 2009), Botha exposed a gross 
calculation error in a senior manager’s remuneration package (Hasenfuss, 2009b). The 
manager in question also happened to be a member of the company’s remuneration 
committee that approved the package. 
Botha has also been very outspoken about local institutional investors’ lack of activism, 
particularly on the topic of executive remuneration: “They are paying lip service to good 
governance and sustainability issues as they are under pressure to produce good results. 
They are notorious for keeping their costs tight, apart from when it comes to their 
bonuses” (Shevel, 2014). In a Moneyweb interview, during which Botha was asked why 
he was apparently the only person in South Africa who was concerned about executive 
remuneration, he responded: “I don’t know. I wish there was somebody else. I wish the 
bigger shareholders would actually take this up because we are setting a bad precedent 
here. When the operating profits are down; when cash generation goes down, you would 
like to see a more balanced approach in terms of awarding bonuses” (Botha in Hogg, 
2010).
Botha acknowledges that most institutional investors in South Africa prefer to engage 
with investee companies behind closed doors. However, in an effort to encourage greater 
transparency, he has repeatedly called on institutional investors to disclose the number of 
shares they vote at shareholder meetings, and how (for, against, abstain) they vote those 
shares: “Anything less leaves stakeholders in the dark” (Botha in Crotty, 2013c). Sadly, very 
few institutional investors have heeded Botha’s calls to date.
Summary and Conclusions 
Although a clear case exists for shareholder responsibility (based on the Enablement 
principle and the notions of reciprocity, interdependence and accountability), few investors 
in South Africa seem to take this responsibility seriously. The findings of this study show 
that institutional shareholder activism in South Africa mainly occurs by means of private 
negotiations and proxy voting. Despite amendments to pension fund legislation and 
initiatives such as the United Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investment and the 
Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa, institutional shareholder activism in the 
country remains muted. Silverman and Duncan (2014) remarked that South Africa still 
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has a long way to go in terms of maturity before the country will be ready to respond to 
shareholder pressure. As far as individual shareholder activism is concerned, Theo Botha 
remains a lone voice in the desert. 
Local investment managers in this study voted against a number of resolutions pertaining 
to executive remuneration in 2013. Most of the shareholder dissent focused on the 
remuneration policies of investee companies. The issues brought to the fore by Botha 
provides more insight on the nature and extent of these concerns. After 2008, Botha has 
increasingly criticised JSE-listed companies for not disclosing sufficient information on 
the performance targets, benchmarks and key performance indicators used to determine 
executives’ pay packages. 
Although calls for improved disclosure have also been reported in international literature 
(Van Niekerk, 2014), these calls do not go unchallenged. Opponents argue that detailed 
public disclosure of CEOs’ salaries has the unintended consequence of pushing these 
payments even higher. In this respect, a local remuneration committee commented that 
South African executives are very aware of what their counterparts are being paid: “If 
they think they’re being short-changed, they leave. And believe me, in South Africa the 
pool of talented executives is very small. So the retention imperative is a very real one” 
(Barron, 2014a).
A second key issue highlighted in this study was the disconnect between executive 
emolument and company performance. Companies that fail to link managers’ incentives 
to performance has received considerable condemnation from shareholder activists 
globally, particularly in the UK (Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ferri & Maber, 2013). In South 
Africa, Botha has been exceptionally critical of poorly performing companies that still 
rewarded their executives by increasing their basic salaries and/or bonuses. 
A 2012 survey among 30 JSE-listed companies revealed that several remuneration 
committees started to recognise the importance of this matter. Their first priority in 2012 
was to design appropriation long-term incentive schemes followed by plans to link pay to 
performance (Harraway et al., 2012). However, the findings of this study seem to support 
Van Niekerk’s (2014) claim that there is indeed a “mounting fury [from shareholders 
and other stakeholders] against the perceived exuberance of executive pay” in South 
Africa. In the following section a number of recommendations are provided to address 
the growing wage gap (and its adverse socio-economic consequences) in the country. 
Recommendations
Evidence from this study suggests that shareholders are increasingly uncomfortable with 
the disclosure and application of executive compensation policies. However, as the vote 
on remuneration policy is non-binding, its impact is limited to signalling shareholder 
discontent. The regulator in South Africa has one of two options to address this matter. 
In the first instance, the regulator could consider changing the non-binding vote to a 
binding one as is the case in the UK and several European countries (Delman, 2010; 
Crotty, 2014b). 
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Since October 2013, the remuneration reports of UK companies are required to not only 
outline the company’s remuneration policy, but the reports should also contain details 
on how the policy was implemented in the financial year being reported on. Companies 
are further required to put their remuneration policies to a shareholder resolution at 
least every three years. As with other ordinary resolutions, a simple majority vote is 
needed for approval. Shareholders in the UK also have an annual advisory vote on a 
resolution to approve the implementation report, showing how the approved pay policy 
has been implemented. The latter should also contain a single figure indicating the total 
pay each director received in that year. Companies that wish to make changes to their 
remuneration policies should present the new policy to shareholders for approval at a 
general meeting. 
Alternatively, the regulator could institute a so-called “two strike” law as in Australia 
(Botha, 2014). The Australian regulator amended that country’s Corporations Act in July 
2011 to hold directors more accountable for the salaries and bonuses they receive. The 
Act stipulates that each director’s individual salary and bonus should be outlined in 
the report. The “first strike” occurs when a company’s remuneration report receives an 
“against” vote of 25 per cent or more at the company’s annual general meeting (AGM). 
The “second strike” occurs when the company’s remuneration report again receives an 
“against” vote of 25 per cent or more at the next AGM. When this “second strike” occurs, 
the shareholders will vote at the same AGM to determine whether all the directors will 
need to stand for re-election (known as the “spill” resolution). If this “spill” resolution 
passes with 50 per cent or more of the eligible votes cast, a “spill meeting” has to take 
place within 90 days of the AGM. At this spill meeting, those individuals who were 
directors when the remuneration report was deemed unsatisfactory, will be required to 
stand for re-election, except for the managing director, who is permitted to continue to 
run the company (Jolly & Bozinovski, 2013). 
In an effort to improve disclosure among public companies, the JSE could consider 
revising its listing requirements. More stringent disclosure requirements would go a 
long way in empowering shareholders to make informed decisions. It is also suggested 
that companies publish more details on how shareholders vote at meetings. At present, 
listed companies are expected to inform the market, via the JSE’s Stock Exchange News 
Service (SENS), of the outcome of the voting process. Although SENS statements such 
as “All resolutions were passed at the AGM” meet the JSE’s listing requirements, they 
hardly reflect a pledge on the part of companies to be transparent. According to a market 
commentator, “the current [level of] disclosure is so brief as to be almost pointless” 
(Crotty, 2014b). If this status quo is set to change (as reported in the media), JSE-listed 
companies will be required to announce the total number of shares voted at their AGMs 
as well as the details of the outcome (for, against or abstain) (Crotty, 2014a). 
It is furthermore proposed that entities such as the Association of Savings and Investments 
SA, encourage their members (especially investment managers) to publish more details 
on their voting policies and practices. 
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Although a few consulting companies already advise institutional investors on 
remuneration-related voting, more of these specialist services are necessary. Botha 
has established such a service for individual investors: “Whereas institutional investors 
have divisions and policies governing how they vote, many individual shareholders 
do not exercise their right to vote because of the effort required to make an informed 
decision” (Botha in Barry, 2014a). Botha hopes that his service will increase the number 
of shareholders who attend AGMs and participate on an informed basis, exercising their 
democratic right to vote (Botha in Barry, 2014a).
A more fundamental intervention to address the growing wage gap in South Africa 
lies with the education of future shareholders, pension fund trustees, asset managers 
and company directors. Much more attention should be given to ethics in mainstream 
financial and investment management qualifications, at both undergraduate and 
postgraduate level. Currently, it appears as if too much emphasis is placed on compliance 
with legislation and professional codes such as the King III report and the CFA’s code 
of ethics and standards for professional conduct. As early as 1994, Paine (1994:111) 
asserted that “even in the best cases, legal compliance is unlikely to unleash much moral 
commitment. The law does not generally seek to inspire human excellence or distinction. 
It is no guide to exemplary behaviour – or even good practice. Those managers who 
define ethics as legal compliance are implicitly endorsing a code of moral mediocrity for 
their organisations”. 
It is therefore recommended that business educators should instil a greater sense of 
moral sensitivity, judgement and courage among their students. Case studies and other 
experiential learning techniques could be used to convey the value of social shareholder 
activism, and the responsibility that shareholders have in an emerging country to ensure 
the fair distribution of resources. The use of these techniques calls for the identification of 
successful shareholder activism examples in South Africa. More research is also required 
on the impact of shareholder activism on changing corporate policies and practices in 
South Africa, including those pertaining to executive remuneration. 
In conclusion, the researcher wholeheartedly agrees with Botha that “it is time for 
institutional investors in South Africa to pick up the activism flame”. In the words of 
Gide (in Davis et al., 2006) all South African investors, irrespective of size, should “work 
and struggle and never accept an evil that you can change”. It is unacceptable that 
shareholders in South Africa continue the enablement of an unjust society by failing to 
monitor and influence managers’ decisions, particularly as they pertain to the size and 
composition of executive remuneration packages.
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End Notes 
1. The number of companies listed on the JSE decreased from a total of 769 in 1990 to 380 in 
2014 (World Federation of Exchanges, 2015). The FTSE/JSE All Share index consists of 160 
companies which represent 99 per cent of the total market capitalisation of the exchange 
(FTSE/JSE Africa index series, 2015).
2. On 31 December 2013, 119 investment managers were registered with the Financial 
Services Board.
3. As at 31 December 2013, a total of 375 companies were listed on the JSE (World Federation 
of Exchanges, 2015). 
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